This pithy comment was sent as an email to fellow anthropologists on the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania listserv, ASAONET. Professor Belshaw has kindly agreed to its inclusion here. In light of his important input to policy makers in the leadup to Independence (see his book Under the Ivi Tree, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), and his warnings even at that time that if there continued to be inadequate leadership, violence could ensue, his comments have particular interest.

Wed, 12 Jul 2000 09:32

Some points about which I now speculate:

1) the tactic of reclaiming land rights through blockades and occupation in now circum-Pacific from the NorthWest Coast of Canada to New Zealand. The Maori have had continuous political-cultural contact with the NorthWest Coast for years, and with Fiji also.

2) Much of the fear of violence can be exaggerated, and most demonstrations are likely to have good humour attached to them. But the proliferation of weapons makes the sudden explosion of anger a real danger.

3) I think that the military's ethos of United Nations service, standing between opposing factions rather than resolving issues, played a part in their abysmal failure to take effective control.

4) The Council of Chiefs does not speak for Fiji. Not only does it exclude other ethnic groups, but it represents the Eastern establishment which the colonial government recognized as dominent, and whose practices passed into law and administration against the wishes of large sections of the indigenous Fijian population, who are still resentful. See the appendix to my book Under the Ivi Tree. It also as a result represents the vested interests of those who receive rent monies, which seldomn trickle down to the individual mataqali member. Many members of the Council, including Ratu Mara, obtained educational expenses through the system as it is now.

5) Indigenous land entitlements and practice deviate enormously from those recorded by the NLTB because of the operation of traditional dynamics not built in to the registration stasis.

6) Because of factors such as these, ANY decisions of the Council of Chiefs will be treated with opposition and suspicion by large segments of the population, whose policies are at sixes and sevens. There will be a de facto power vacuum much as there has been during the hostage taking.

7) Some leaders and people, especially in the West, accept some of Speight's "objectives", but oppose others.

8) Speight's personal material goals have been lost sight of in all this, obfuscated cleverly by seizing on the land and race issues.

9) Unless a "strong man" emerges - who in the end could be Speight himself - Fiji is destined to have political warfare between numerous group interests with overtones of chaos and violence. And to put it bluntly, the weak leadership failing to give Speight his come-uppance and eventually giving him almost everything he wants is a disgrace and damaging. It does not bolster the Fijian claim that they know best how to run the country. Fortunately there are many Fijians who do have that capacity -- if only they can find their voices. You won't find many of them in the Council of Chiefs right now.

Cyril Belshaw © 12 Jul 2000